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DLD-216        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3383 
___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER M. COLEMAN, JR., 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
 OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-00857) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 14, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Christopher M. Coleman appeals from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint against the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).  As no substantial question 
is raised by the appeal, we will grant the Secretary’s motion to summarily affirm the 
Court’s judgment.  See L.A.R. 27.4. 
 Coleman’s complaint alleges that he was employed by the Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”), an agency within the DHS, as a Transportation Security Officer 
(“TSO”).  In July of 2013, he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that TSA was harassing him because he missed work 
due to health conditions.  Sometime thereafter, Coleman was terminated; the TSA said 
his termination was because he suffered from major depressive disorder.  Coleman then 
filed a second complaint with the EEOC. 
 After filing an earlier counseled complaint,1 Coleman filed the pro se complaint at 
issue here in 2015, complaining of the same conduct alleged in the first complaint.  
Coleman’s complaint was ostensibly brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, but the District Court also generously 
                                              
1 Coleman filed a counseled federal lawsuit in 2014, raising claims under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act.  The defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss arguing that his Rehabilitation Act claim was precluded by the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 44935, and that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider his Family and Medical Leave Act claim.  Coleman’s 
attorney then voluntarily dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1) 
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considered the complaint as raising a federal claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, and a state-law defamation claim.  The District Court granted the 
Secretary’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Coleman timely 
appealed.  The Secretary has asked us to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 530 (3d Cir. 2012).  In reviewing an order 
granting a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), we must determine whether the allegations in the 
complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the District Court’s jurisdiction.  
Common Cause v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 We agree with the District Court that even accepting all of Coleman’s allegations 
as true, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his claims.  First, we agree that 
Coleman’s claims against the Secretary in his official capacity are barred by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, as the DHS has not consented to suit.  See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal 
Government and its agencies from suit.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 
(1985) (person sued in official capacity can claim immunities available to the agency, 
such as sovereign immunity).  Second, any ADA claim against TSA fails as government 
agencies are excluded as “employers” under the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i).  
Third, any claim under the Rehabilitation Act fails as the ATSA precludes TSOs from 
                                                                                                                                                  
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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bringing claims under that Act against the TSA.  See 49 U.S.C. § 44935; Field v. 
Napolitano, 663 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir. 2011) (listing cases).2  Fourth, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
does not provide a private right of action.  See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 
(10th Cir. 2007); see also Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining test for finding implied private right of action).  And finally, because the 
District Court properly dismissed all federal claims in Coleman’s complaint, the District 
Court properly declined to exercise supplementary jurisdiction over Coleman’s 
defamation claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 
2000).3 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4   
                                              
2 As the Secretary argues, “The ATSA . . . provides that ‘notwithstanding any provision 
of law,’ 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)(2)(A), at a minimum, screeners must ‘possess basic 
aptitudes and physical abilities, including color perception, visual and aural 
acuity, physical coordination, and motor skills,’ id. § 44935(f)(1)(B), and must ‘meet 
such other qualifications as the [TSA Administrator] may establish,’ id. 
§ 44935(e)(2)(A)(iv).”  Motion for Summary Affirmance at 3-4.  As explained in Field, 
these provisions evidence Congress’ intent to preclude suits by TSA employees under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  663 F.3d at 511-12. 
 
3 Before dismissing a deficient complaint with prejudice, a court generally must inform 
the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set time period.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  But such leave need not be 
granted where amendment would be futile.  See id.  Due to the preclusive effect of the 
ATSA, it appears that any amendment would have been futile.  Further, this was already 
Coleman’s second attempt to bring suit on the same factual basis.  
   
4 In his complaint, Coleman contends that he should have been granted a hearing and 
should have been appointed counsel.  But because the District Court lacked jurisdiction, 
neither of these things was warranted. 
